A clue of double decryption mechanism was introduced at Eurocrypt '02 by Cramer and Shoup, and it was revisited at Asiacrypt '03 by Bresson, Catalano and Pointcheval. Previous double decryption schemes are designed based on Z n 2 where n = pq for two primes, p and q. Note that, they use the Paillier's scheme as a primitive scheme to design a double decryption mechanism. In this paper, we propose an efficient public key scheme with double decryption mechanism based on Z p 2 q . Our scheme is more efficient than the previous schemes. Moreover, we review the previous schemes in a privacy point of view and propose a privacy enhanced double decryption scheme.
Introduction
Public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as a useful tool for secure communication, therefore designing a good PKC is an essential task for not only theoretic purpose but also practical purpose. When designing a PKC, we have to consider two conditions, security and efficiency.
In security point of view, two conditions are considered, one-wayness and semantic security. One-wayness is regarded as a basic condition for secure scheme, but it is not a sufficient condition to gain real security. In these days, the semantic security is also required as a fundamental condition for the security of PKC. In [2] , some examples which illustrate the need of semantic security are listed. For example, to design an authenticated key exchange protocol in the publickey setting, the scheme has to meet IND-CCA2 security. However, even though a scheme is secure, we have to check whether the scheme is efficient or not. In general, the efficiency is regarded as an important condition as the security.
In [4] , Cramer and Shoup introduced a clue of double decryption mechanism. After that, Bresson et al. revisited the mechanism and proposed a double decryption scheme [1] . The previous double decryption mechanisms are derived from Paillier's scheme [13] , which is designed based on Z n 2 where n = pq for two primes. Since the size of modulo of Paillier's scheme is twice than that of standard RSA or ElGamal in same security level, the efficiency of Paillier's scheme is not favorable. Hence the efficiency of the previous double decryption scheme is also not good. So, it is worth designing an efficient double decryption scheme.
In [1] , Bresson et al. stated the necessity of double decryption scheme and proposed a scheme that solves the following two scenarios.
1. The head of a group may want to be able to read any message sent to the members of the group. 2. People may want to be able to recover the plaintexts even if they loose their private key.
To solve above two scenarios simultaneously, we need a kind of super-key. In [1] , factoring information is given to authority as a super-key. But, in this scenario, we have some apprehensions about an invasion of privacy, since authority can decrypt any ciphertext without any consent of corresponding user. To prevent the abuse of super-key, i.e., to enhance the privacy of users, we need a way to restrict the excessive ability of authority.
In this paper, we propose an efficient double decryption scheme based on Z p 2 q . Our scheme is efficient than the previous schemes [4, 1] , since our scheme executes the cryptographic operations, such as modulo multiplication and exponentiation, on a smaller modulo than the previous schemes. Our basic scheme provides about 3 times faster encryption and decryption for ordinary user than the previous scheme. Moreover, the authority can decrypt a ciphertext about 4 times faster than the previous scheme. By modifying our basic scheme, we propose a scheme which can get rid of the apprehension of the invasion of privacy without losing the double decryption mechanism.
Preliminaries
From now, we review two previous schemes and describe the number-theoretic framework underlying our scheme.
Previous Schemes
In [1] , Bresson, Catalano and Pointcheval proposed a modification of Paillier's scheme, which provides double trapdoor decryption mechanism. Let n = pq be a safe-prime modulo, i.e. p and q are primes of the form p = 2p +1 and q = 2q +1, where p and q are also primes. Let G be the cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo n 2 . Then ord(G) = λ(n 2 )/2 = nλ(n)/2. Note that every element of order n is of the form α = 1 + kn for some k ∈ Z n . Key generation. Choose two primes p and q (|p| = |q|), and let n = pq. Choose a random α ∈ Z n 2 , a random number a ∈ [1, ord(G)] and set g = α 2 mod n and h = g a mod n 2 . The public key is (n, g, h) while the corresponding secret key is a. Two prime factors, p and q, are superkey-like secret key. Encryption. Given a message m ∈ Z n , choose a random r ∈ Z n 2 . Then the ciphertext is computed as follows: C = (A, B) where A = g r mod n 2 and B = h r (1 + mn) mod n 2 . Decryption1. First trapdoor is similar to that of ElGamal scheme. Knowing a, decryption operation is executed as follows: m = (B/A a − 1 mod n 2 )/n. Decryption2. Second decryption mechanism uses the factoring information of n as a secret key. If the prime factors are provided, a mod n and r mod n are easily recovered (see [1] for details). If we write ar mod ord(G) by γ 1 + γ 2 n then γ 1 = ar mod n. Firstly, compute
Let π be the inverse of λ(n) in Z * n , then m is recovered by the following simple computation:
By analyzing the scheme in [1] , we can see that if a group has a mechanism that solves the discrete logarithm problem, a double decryption scheme can be designed based on the group.
In [12] , a novel scheme proposed by Okamoto and Uchiyama as OU scheme in short, is based on Z p 2 q . The scheme uses such a mechanism that solves the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore we can design a double decryption scheme based on Z p 2 q . So, it is meaningful to review the scheme [12] .
OU scheme is based on a logarithmic function, L, defined over p-Sylow subgroup of Z *
p . The function L is well-defined and has a homomorphic property from multiplication to addition (see [12] for details). Let
Key generation. Choose two primes p and q (|p| = |q| = k), and let n = p 2 q. Choose a random g in Z n such that the order of g p−1 mod p 2 is p. Let h = g n mod n. The public key is (n, g, h, k) while the corresponding secret key is (p, q).
, choose a random r ∈ Z n . Then the ciphertext is computed as following:
Discrete Logarithm and Diffie-Hellman Problem over Z p 2 q
The Diffie-Hellman problem [6] is a well-known cryptographic primitive. Until now, the Diffie-Hellman problem remains the most widely used cryptographic technique. Our scheme is also designed based on a kinds of Diffie-Hellman problem, denoted by p-DHP.
Let P(k) be the set of prime numbers of length k. Choose two primes p and
Definition 1. (p-DHP) The p-DHP is defined as follows: Given a set
Although it is not known whether DHP over Z * p 2 q is more tractable than DHP over Z * rs (r and s are prime numbers such that |r| = |s|) or vice versa, the security of a prime order subgroup of Z * rs is studied in [10] . The attack described in [10] is valid only on the prime order subgroup of Z * rs rather than composite order subgroup. Note that, our scheme use a generator g whose order is composite number. Moreover, there is no known attack for breaking the DHP over Z * p 2 q . So, the hardness of p-DHP is based on the size of modulo. The size of exponent, k bit, is not too small to be broken, since 160 bit of exponent is sufficient to gain the desired security on DHP in these days.
Conjecture 1.
For every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for sufficiently large k,
From now, we define a kind of DLP over Z * n , denoted by p-DLP. After that, we will prove that the hardness of p-DLP is equivalent to factoring n. Proof. (⇒) Suppose that the factoring assumption does not hold. Let A = g a mod n for some a ∈ Z n . Since we can find the factoring of n, a mod p is recovered as following:
Definition 2. (p-DLP) The
(⇐) Suppose that there exist an algorithm A which solves p-DLP over Z n . Choose a random k ∈ [2 k+1 , n] and compute g k . Then, for given g
Remark 1. We proved that p-DLP over Z n is hard to solve if and only if the factoring assumption holds by using the idea in [12] . In [12] , it is proved that the one-wayness of OU scheme is intractable if and only if the factoring assumption holds. The hardness of p-DLP is equivalent to the one-wayness of OU scheme and so we have the following relations: p-DLP ⇔ factoring assumption ⇔ onewayness of OU scheme.
Semantic Security
The notion of securities are firstly considered in [8, 5] . After the concept of semantic securities are announced, many general conversion methods that make a semantically secure scheme from a naive scheme are proposed in [7, 15, 3, 9] .
From now, we describe one of the previous general conversion methods. By using the method, we can make a semantically secure double decryption scheme from our naive double decryption scheme. Notice that, this is just a summary of the general conversion method of Kiltz and Lee [9] , so, any understanding reader who knows the method need not see this section.
General Conversion Method of Kiltz and Lee. Kiltz and Lee proposed a general construction for public key encryption schemes that are IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model [9] . The conversion method based on a general hard problem called as Y-computational problem (YCP). They point out that many of the most widely used cryptographic primitives, such as RSA and DiffieHellman, are YCP.
Definition 3. An instance generator
I Y C (1 k ) for YC outputs a description of (S 1 , S 2 , f 1 , f 2 ,
t).
Here S 1 and S 2 are sets with
The functions f 1 , f 2 and t should be easy to evaluate and it should be possible to sample efficiently from S 1 . Let A be an adversary and define
.
We define the advantage function Adv
IY C (1 k , t) = max{Adv A,IY C (1 k )}
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries that run for time t. We say that YCP is hard for
Under YCP in the random oracle model, Kiltz and Lee propose a general construction of an IND-CPA secure cryptosystem. The conversion model is composed as following:
where E is symmetric encryption function and κ = G(f 2 (r)) where G is an hash function. Let the converted encryption scheme as Π 0 . By applying the conversion method in [7] , they convert the cryptosystem Π 0 to a cryptosystem Π 1 that is IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model. The converted IND-CCA2 secure scheme is composed as following:
. where E is a symmetric encryption function, H is an hash function and κ = G(f 2 (H(m||r))) where G is an hash function.
User's Privacy Against Authority
In general, a malicious authority of a system is not distinguished from other adversaries. However, in some cases, the authority has more information than other players. Hence, it needs to distinguish the malicious authority from other adversaries. The authority in the system of the previous double decryption scheme also has such an information, the factoring. So, the authority can decrypt any ciphertext without the consent of an user by using the factoring information. As a result, any user can not expect a privacy against the authority. For this reason, we define the privacy of an encryption scheme against a malicious authority as the one-wayness and semantic security against the authority. 
Then the scheme Π is one-way against the authority if and only if there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for sufficiently large
k, Adv ow−atk A,Π,ssp (1 k ) ≤ negl(k).
Definition 5. (Semantic Security against Authority) Under the same condition of Definition 4, let A be the authority that breaks the semantic security of the scheme, then the advantage of A is defined as following:
Adv ind−atk A,Π,ssp (1 k ) = 2P r A(c, p k , ssp) (s k , p k ) ← K(psp); M0, M1 ← {0, 1} n ; = b b ← {0, 1}; C ← E sk (M b ); − 1.
Then the scheme Π is semantically secure against the authority if and only if there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for sufficiently large k, Adv ind−atk
It is easy to grasp the notions, since the notions are defined based on the existing notions of one-wayness and semantic security. A difference of these notions and the existing notions is the information given to the adversary. If we think the secret system parameters s sp as a public information, one-wayness and semantic security against the authority are same as the previous notion of securities against the ordinary adversary. So, in this case, only the secret key of a user s k is secret information which does not given to the authority. Since the notion of securities against the authority can be seen as the previous notions, the relation of notion of securities [2] are holds equivalently.
In the previous scheme [1] , the modulo n and the generator g is public system parameters while the prime factors p and q are the secret system parameters. Sometimes, the public system parameters are duplicated with the public key information of an user. For example, the generator g is public system parameter and also the public key information of all users. However, the secret system parameters are not duplicated and remains secret to the public, so the duplication is not a matter for our definition. random k − 1 bit a and compute h = g a mod n. The public key is (n, g, h, k) while the corresponding secret key is a. Two prime factors, p and q, are superkey-like secret key. Only the authority knows the factoring of n. Encryption. Given a message m ∈ Z n , choose a random k − 1 bit r. 
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
One-Wayness. Our scheme is broken if one can solves p-DHP or p-DLP. In general, DLP is hard to solve than DHP. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that the one-wayness of our scheme is equivalent to the hardness of p-DHP.
Theorem 2. Our double decryption scheme is one-way if and only if the p-DHP is hard.
Proof. Assume that the p-DHP is not hard. Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm B which can solve p-DHP with non-negligible probability. We will construct a polynomial time algorithm A, with help of B, which can break the one-wayness of our scheme. Let the challenge ciphertext and public key be (A = g r mod n, B = g ar m mod n) and (n, g, g a ), respectively. Since B can compute g ar mod n from (g r mod n, g a mod n), the corresponding plaintext is computed as m = B/g ar mod n. So, the scheme is not one-way. Conversely, suppose that the proposed scheme is not one-way. Then for given ciphertext, an adversary A can recover the plaintext with non-negligible probability. We can make a polynomial time adversary B, with help of A, which can solve p-DHP. Let (g a mod n, g b mod n) be a challenge pair to compute g ab mod n. Set (n, g, g a ) and (A = g b mod n, B = g k mod n) for some k ∈ Z n as public key data and ciphertext, respectively. Note that k = ab+k for some k . So
Since the proposed scheme is not one-way, A can recover the corresponding plaintext m from
Remark 2. When m is an element of Z n of order q − 1, m has no component in G p . In this case, the problem of inverting the encryption function for such message is not reduced to the p-DHP. However, the probability that a randomly chosen massage m has of order q − 1 is about 1 2 k . So, the problem of inverting the encryption function is completely reduced to the p-DHP except for negligible probability Semantic Security. To apply the general conversion method proposed in [9] , the security of a scheme has to be based on a kind of YCP. As commented in [9] , DHP is a YCP. So, we can apply the conversion method to our scheme and then our scheme is semantically secure against CCA2 adversary.
Let H, G be two hash functions, then the converted encryption function is given as following: E pk (m, r) = (g H(m||r) mod n, E κ (m||r)) where E is symmetric encryption function and κ = G(h H(m||r) mod n). As commented in [9] , we can enhance the efficiency by using the one-time pad as the symmetric function E (i.e., E κ (m||r) = κ ⊕ (m||r)).
In [9] , the enhanced security of ElGamal encryption scheme is proved. According to their proof, ElGamal encryption scheme is secure against CCA2 attacker if the corresponding computational DHP is intractable and the symmetric encryption scheme is OTE 1 secure. Since our scheme is a ElGamal type encryption scheme which is based its security on the computational p-DHP. We omit the proof of the semantic security against CCA2 attack, since the security proof for ElGamal type is given in [9] . 
Theorem 3. In the random oracle model, the converted our scheme is IND-CCA2 secure if the computational p-DHP is intractable and the symmetric encryption scheme E is OTE secure.

Efficiency
We denote a modular exponentiation under modulo M with exponent e by M E(|M |, |e|) where |M | and |e| are the bit length of modulo M and exponent e, respectively. Note that, the computational complexity of M E(a, b) and M E(αa, βb) are in the ratio of 1 to α 2 β. For example, the calculation of M E(a, b) is 12 = 2 2 3 times faster than that of M E(2a, 3b). In [14] , Rene Peralta claims that the hardness of factoring of 1600 bit integer of the form p 2 q is equivalent to 1000 bit RSA integer. So, to compare the efficiency in same security level, we have to compare 1600 bit integer of the form p 2 q with 1000 bit RSA modulo.
We compare our scheme with the previous double decryption scheme [1] . The previous scheme is semantically secure in the standard model. On the other hand, our scheme is semantically secure in the random oracle model. So, we compare the efficiency of two double decryption schemes in the plain scheme point of view. Here, the term plain scheme means the basic model that is not transformed to CCA2 secure scheme. Our scheme is more efficient than the previous double decryption schemes. The scheme in [1] needs 4000 bit ciphertext to guarantee the same security as 1000 bit RSA. However, our scheme needs only 3200 bit ciphertext. Moreover, the length of plaintext is larger than that of the scheme in [1] . From a computational complexity point of view, our scheme is more efficient that that of [1] . The encryption and decryption of our scheme is faster than the previous scheme about 3 times. Moreover, the cost of authority's decryption is about 4 times cheaper than the previous scheme.
Privacy Enhanced Double Decryption Scheme
Our double decryption scheme, proposed in the section 3, involves the same apprehension about the invasion of privacy as the previous double decryption schemes, i.e., authority can decrypt any ciphertext without a consent of an user. To solve the problem, we need some trick to restrict the ability of authority. In this section, we propose a double decryption scheme which provides a way to restrain the unlimited ability of authority.
From now, we give a detailed description of the scheme for a reader to gain a better understanding of our idea, though there are many repetition.
Description of the Privacy Enhanced Double Decryption Scheme
Key generation. Choose two primes p and q (|p| = |q| = k), and let n = p 2 q. Choose a random g ∈ Z * n such that the order of g p−1 mod p 2 is p. If an user allows the authority to decrypt his ciphertext, he chooses a random k − 1 bit integer a and compute h = g a mod n. Otherwise, he choose a random t bit a where t > k, and compute h = g a mod n. Then the public key is (n, g, h, k) or (n, g, h, t) while the corresponding secret key is a. Two prime factors, p and q, are superkey-like secret key. Only the authority knows the factoring of n. Encryption. Given a message m ∈ Z n , choose a random t bit r. Then the ciphertext is computed as follows: C = (A, B) where A = (g r mod n and B = h r m mod n). 
The authority computes A a mod n by using a. Then m is recovered by the following simple computation: m = B/A a mod n.
Remark 3.
If the user does not consent, the authority can not recovers the secret exponent a. The authority can find a = a mod p since he knows the factoring of n. However, for sufficiently large k and t, it is hard to finding out a from a . So the authority can not recover the plaintext for given ciphertext. The hardness of this problem will be discussed and proved in the next section.
Remark 4. When a sender want to permit the authority's ability of decryption, he choose k−1 bit r and compute g r mod n. Then the authority can decrypt the ciphertext generated by the sender by computing the secret exponent r though the corresponding receiver dose not consent the authority's decryption. At first, the authority computes (g
Remark 5. In the case of the encrypted information is not important to an user's privacy, the user will consent the authority to decrypt his ciphertext to enjoy the properties of double decryption mechanism.
Security Analysis of the Privacy Enhanced Double Decryption Scheme
Since the privacy enhanced double decryption scheme is not based its security on p-DHP, we introduce a variant of p-DHP, denoted by t-DHP. Formal definition of t-DHP is given below.
Definition 6. (t-DHP) The t-DHP is defined as follows: Given a set
Conjecture 2. For every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for sufficiently large t and k,
Intuitively, we can say that the t-DHP is harder than p-DHP, since the exponent of t-DHP is larger than that of p-DHP. Under the hardness of t-DHP, we can prove that the privacy enhanced double decryption scheme is intractable.
Theorem 4. The privacy enhanced double decryption scheme is one-way if and only if the t-DHP is hard to solve.
Proof. If the t-DHP is not hard, there exists a polynomial time algorithm B which solves the t-DHP. By using B, we can construct a polynomial time algorithm A that breaks the one-wayness of the privacy enhanced scheme. Let (n, g, g a ) be the public key parameters and let (A = g r mod n, B = g ar m mod n) be a challenge ciphertext. Then, B can compute g ar mod n from the pair (g a mod n, g r mod n), so A can compute the corresponding plaintext as following: m = B/g ar mod n. Suppose that the scheme is not one-way. Then there exists an adversary A that recovers the plaintext for given ciphertext. By using A, we can solve the t-DHP in polynomial time. Let (g a mod n, g b mod n) be a challenge. Set (n, g, g a ) as the public key parameters. Then, compute (A = g b mod n, B = g k mod n) for some k ∈ Z n and set the pair as the ciphertext which corresponds to the public key parameters. In this case, k = ab + k for some k . Then, the algorithm A returns m = g k mod n as the plaintext of the ciphertext (
We can solve the t-DHP by computing g ab = g k /m mod n with help of A.
We have to consider the security of the privacy enhanced scheme against the authority since a malicious authority has more information than other adversary, the factoring of n. So, we define a variant of t-DHP named as t p -DHP to formalize the security of privacy enhanced scheme against the authority.
Definition 7. (t p -DHP) Given a set
where t > k, compute g ab mod n where n = p 2 q and the prime factors are known.
We can simplify the t p -DHP to show that the problem is sufficiently hard to solve against the authority. 
mod n. The factoring information permits the authority to compute partial information about the secret exponent when the modulo has the form of n = p 2 q. However, if the exponent is a multiple of p, the authority can not find any information about the secret exponent. So, for the pair (g a p , g b p ), he can not recover any information about the secret exponent, i.e., the authority can not solve the DHP for given (g a , g b ) by computing the secret exponent, a and b.
Since the authority knows the factoring, he can reduce the problem on Z n to the problem on a subgroup of Z n . As commented in [11] , the hardness of DLP over Z n is equals to the hardness of DLP over the subgroup of Z n . Similarly, the DHP over Z n is equals to the problem of the DHP over Z p 2 and Z q and we prove it in Theorem 5. 
Then we compute z a mod n and z b mod n as following by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2:
Since x = z a mod p 2 and x = z a mod q, x = z a mod n. Similarly, y = z b mod n. We compute z ab mod n by using algorithm B for (z a mod n, z b mod n) where z is used as a generator. Then, g ab mod p 2 is computed as (z ab mod n) mod p 2 = g ab mod p 2 . We can solve the DHP over Z q in the same way.
The security of the t p -DHP is equal to the security of the DHP over Z p 2 and Z q . However, if the difference between t and k is small, the t p -DHP is not secure against the authority, since the authority can recover a for given g a mod n where a = a + a p and so the remained secret information is t − k bit integer a . Hence, when t − k is small, the authority can find a by brute-forcing. If we choose large t to make it hard to guessing a then the t p -DHP is sufficiently hard to solve against the authority.
Conjecture 3.
For every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for sufficiently large t and k,
Under the hardness of t p -DHP, we can prove that the privacy enhanced double decryption scheme is secure against a malicious authority. Note that, to achieve sufficient security against the authority, we should use large k than the scheme proposed in Section 3. The proof of Theorem 6 is same to Theorem 4, except the hard problem, the t p -DHP.
Theorem 6. The privacy enhanced double decryption scheme is one-way against a malicious authority if and only if the t p -DHP is hard to solve.
The one-wayness of privacy enhanced scheme against the ordinary adversary and the authority is based on the t-DHP and the t p -DHP, respectively. The t-DHP and the t p -DHP are also YCP, so we can use the general conversion method proposed in [9] to achieve the semantic security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. The converted scheme of privacy enhanced scheme is as following: E pk (m, r) = (g H(m||r) mod n, E κ (m||r)) where E is symmetric encryption function, H and G are two hash functions, and κ = G(h H(m||r) mod n). Semantic security of the converted scheme is proved similar to Theorem 3.
Theorem 7.
In the random oracle model, the converted scheme is IND-CCA2 secure if the computational t-DHP is intractable and the symmetric encryption scheme E is OTE secure. Especially, the scheme is IND-CCA2 secure against the authority if the t p -DHP is intractable. Remark 6. Since the authority has the factoring information, it looks like that the semantic security of the privacy enhanced scheme can be defeated by the author-ity. However, the previous conversion method guarantee the semantic security of a scheme if the one-wayness of the scheme is based on a kind of YCP. So, the privacy enhanced double decryption scheme is secure against IND-CCA2 adversary.
Since the privacy enhanced scheme achieves the one-wayness and the semantic security against the authority, the scheme is enhanced in the privacy point of view. If an user want to get rid of the apprehension of invasion of privacy, he will renounce the property, double decryption mechanism. However, he can choose whether to use the property or not. The property is not duty anymore in our scheme. So, we say that our scheme is enhanced in the privacy point of view rather perfectly secure against the authority.
Obviously, the security of the privacy enhanced doubled decryption scheme against the authority differs from the other adversaries. However, by choosing sufficiently large k and t, we can make the scheme achieve enough security against both the authority and ordinary adversaries.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient public key cryptosystem with a double decryption mechanism and a modification that offers to an user more higher privacy than the previous double decryption scheme. Compared with [1] , our schemes have the following advantages:
1. Efficiency: The length of ciphertext is shorter than that of the previous scheme in the same security level. Moreover, the encryption and decryption of our scheme is faster than those of the previous scheme about 3 times. Especially, the authority's decryption is faster about 4 times than that of the previous scheme. 2. Security (Privacy against the authority): The privacy enhanced double decryption scheme is secure against the authority who knows the factoring of n. In the previous scheme, the authority can recover any ciphertext by using the factoring information. However, in our scheme, the authority's excessive ability is restricted.
However, the efficiency of the basic double decryption scheme that we proposed is better than that of the previous scheme, but the privacy enhanced double decryption scheme is not efficient than that of the previous scheme. So, it is an open problem to design a double decryption scheme that raises the efficiency and enhances the privacy against the authority simultaneously.
